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Developing Oversight Frameworks for 
Nanobiotechnology 
Jordan Paradise, Susan M. Wolf, Gurumurthy 
Ramachandran, Efrosini Kokkoli, Ralph Hall & Jennifer 
Kuzma* 
Nanotechnology involves the ability to work at the atomic 
and molecular level to create structures with fundamentally 
new molecular structures in order to exploit novel properties 
that do not normally exist at a larger size.  The National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), made up of twenty-six U.S. 
federal agencies including the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
contributed to the development of a description of 
nanotechnology as involving: 
(1) [r]esearch and technology development at the atomic, molecular 
or macromolecular levels, in the length scale of approximately 1-100 
nanometer range; (2) creating and using structures, devices and 
systems that have novel properties and functions because of their 
small and/or intermediate size; and (3) ability to control or 
manipulate at the atomic scale.1 
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This is a burgeoning field with a large number of potential 
applications in medicine, drug development, engineering, 
robotics, electronics, fiber optics, energy, food and agriculture, 
and environmental science.  Nanobiotechnology specifically 
refers to nanotechnology designed for use in biological systems 
or in which nanomaterials are derived from biological 
molecules.2  Over 500 products advertised as nanotechnology-
based consumer products have already hit the market.3  These 
include products with biologically active nanostructures (e.g., 
Spray For Life® Nano-Synergy Vitamin B12 Energy Booster, 
Abraxane™ anticancer drug, and Canola Active cooking oil 
fortified with phytosterol nanocapsules).4 
Oversight systems specific to nanotechnology have not yet 
been created; stakeholders, government, industry, academia, 
and the public are debating whether and how to craft such 
systems and address emerging safety, social, and ethical 
issues.5  The United States has no coordinated policy for 
oversight of the products and applications of nanotechnology 
and uncertainty prevails over how existing general regulatory 
regimes and industry standards apply to emerging 
nanotechnologies.  Empirical assessment of health and 
environmental risks is still in process.  At the same time, 
public understanding of nanotechnology is rudimentary and 
Foundation. The authors would like to thank Research Assistants Rishi 
Gupta, M.S.; Jee-Ae Kim; Adam Kokotovitch; Gail Mattey Diliberto; Pouya 
Najmaie; and Alison Wedekind for their valuable input on the project. The 
authors would also like to thank Audrey Boyle for her coordination of the 
project. 
 1. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NANOTECHNOLOGY: AN EPA RESEARCH 
PERSPECTIVE: FACTSHEET (2007), available at http:// 
es.epa.gov/ncer/nano/factsheet/nanofactsheetjune07.pdf. 
 2. M.C. Roco, Nanoscale Science and Engineering: Unifying and 
Transforming Tools, 50 AM. INST. CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 890, 895–96 (2004). 
 3. See The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, An Inventory of Nanotechnology-Based 
Consumer Products Currently on the Market, 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/ inventories/consumer/ (last visited Feb. 20, 
2008). 
 4. Id. 
 5. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 27–28 (2006), available at http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/managing_effects_nanotechnology/. 
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public concern exists.6  Nanotechnology, and 
nanobiotechnology specifically, warrants active discussion of 
potential oversight mechanisms to assure public confidence in 
safety and, when health effects are a goal, efficacy.  This 
article focuses on nanobiotechnology, which most directly 
raises questions of how oversight can address safety and 
efficacy, outlines the current debate on oversight in the United 
States, suggests why deliberate development of oversight 
strategies is important, and recommends how to develop them. 
I. THE OVERSIGHT DEBATE 
Developing oversight approaches for nanobiotechnology is 
daunting.  Nanobiotechnology encompasses a wide range of 
fields and products; a single oversight model may be 
unrealistic.  Some argue that nanotechnology is suitably 
covered by existing regulatory and non-regulatory oversight 
activities.7  Others disagree, arguing that nanoproducts 
already on the market have failed to receive the oversight they 
require.8  The debate centers on issues including modes of 
human exposure, toxicity levels, increased reactivity and novel 
physical properties of nanoparticles, possibility for 
environmental dispersion, and unique physiological 
distribution in the body such as the ability to cross the blood-
brain barrier.  Canvassing oversight options for 
nanotechnology requires considering government regulatory 
structures, systems for coordinating multiple agency action, 
non-governmental standards, and international frameworks. 
A.  GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
U.S. federal agencies have begun to consider oversight 
options.  The EPA oversees human exposure to chemicals in 
 6. JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, INFORMED PUBLIC 
PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8–13 
(2005), available at 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/informed_ 
public_perceptions/. 
 7. Ted Agres, Disagreement About FDA Nanotech Oversight, SCIENTIST, 
Oct. 11, 2006,  http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/25041/. 
 8. See Ctr. for Sci., Tech. & Pub. Policy, Univ. of Minn., The 
Nanotechnology-Biology Interface: Exploring Models for Oversight: 
Workshop Report 18–28 (Jennifer Kuzma ed., 2005), available at 
http://www.hhh.umn. edu/img/assets/9685/nanotech_jan06.pdf. 
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the environment under a number of statutes.  One statute 
that may apply to exposure to nanochemicals is the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92, 
developed 30 years ago.9  TSCA regulates “new chemicals” 
beyond those existing chemicals listed in TSCA Inventory.10  
Since many nanochemicals are variations of chemicals listed 
in TSCA Inventory, although at much smaller sizes and often 
with different properties and characteristics, questions remain 
about whether nanoparticles are “new” chemicals under 
TSCA, which would be the trigger for pre-market notification.  
This issue has taken on some urgency as a major carbon 
nanotube (CNT) manufacturer and supplier has classified its 
carbon nanotubes as synthetic graphite,11 a relatively 
innocuous substance listed on the TSCA Inventory, despite the 
fact that toxicity studies to date show CNTs to have a higher 
toxicity than traditional graphite.12  In 2005, the EPA held 
public meetings and requested comments on the feasibility of 
a voluntary oversight program involving industry cooperation 
in creating industry-wide standards for developing and 
commercializing chemicals at the nanoscale.13  The EPA 
formed the National Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory 
Committee Interim Ad Hoc Work Group on Nanoscale 
Materials in 2005 in order to design this voluntary nanoscale 
materials program and to consider potential EPA review of 
nanoscale materials under TSCA.14  EPA oversight efforts 
have been focused on catalyzing private voluntary agreement 
 9. The Toxic Substances Control Act was originally enacted on October 
11, 1976 by Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(9) (2000). 
 11. UNIDYM, INC., MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET: UNIDYM CARBON 
NANOTUBES 1 (2007), available at http://www.unidym.com/files/msds_cni_ 
nanotubes.pdf. 
 12. Chui-wing Lam et al., A Review of Carbon Nanotube Toxicity and 
Assessment of Potential Occupational and Environmental Health Risks, 36 
CRITICAL REVIEWS TOXICOLOGY 189, 206 (2006). 
 13. Notice of Public Meeting on Nanoscale Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 24574 
(May 10, 2005). 
 14. INTERIM AD HOC WORK GROUP ON NANOSCALE MATERIALS, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT’L POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS ADVISORY 
COMM. (NPPTAC), OVERVIEW OF ISSUES FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND 
CONSIDERATION BY NPPTAC 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/npptac/pubs/nanowgoverviewdraft050921finalv2.pdf
. 
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on standards.15  In addition, the agency in 2007 proposed a 
voluntary framework for manufacturers of nanomaterials 
under TSCA.16  There have been analyses of EPA’s ability to 
regulate nanomaterials under TSCA which suggest that the 
law is inadequate or is being interpreted in a manner that 
does not ensure pre-market testing and safety.17  In November 
2006, the EPA utilized a different approach and announced its 
intent to regulate consumer items developed with silver 
nanoparticles marketed as “germ-killing” (including many food 
storage containers, air fresheners, and washing machines) as 
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act due to concerns regarding environmental 
release.18 
The FDA also has authority over certain nanoproducts, 
especially biologically active nanostructures in human drugs 
and medical devices.19  The agency generally regulates on a 
product-by-product basis, with products often categorized 
according to the mode of action, and uses intended by the 
manufacturer.  The FDA currently applies its existing 
regulatory approaches for drugs, medical devices, combination 
products, foods, and cosmetics to nanotechnology products.20  
This approach has been questioned, with some arguing that 
nanotechnology warrants its own oversight provisions.21 
 15. Id. 
 16. Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program and Inventory Status of 
Nanoscale Substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act: Notice of 
Availability, 72 Fed. Reg. 38083, 38085–86 (July 12, 2007). 
 17. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, EPA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: 
OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2007), available at 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/epa_nanotechnology_ove
rsight_for_21st/; see also Jennifer Kuzma, Nanotechnology Oversight: Just Do 
It, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10913, 10923 (2006). 
 18. Rick Weiss, EPA to Regulate Nanoproducts Sold as Germ-Killing, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2006 at A01; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000). 
 19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–60 (2000). 
 20. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS, http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/regulation.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2008). 
 21. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, REGULATING THE PRODUCTS 
OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: DOES FDA HAVE THE TOOLS IT NEEDS? 45–53 (2006), 
available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/ 
regulating_products_nanotechnology_does/. 
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Meanwhile, the FDA is reviewing, and in some cases has 
approved, nanoproducts using established oversight paths 
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).22  
Under this statute, new drugs are regulated through a pre-
market testing and approval process and have to meet safety, 
efficacy, and manufacturing standards.  Higher risk devices 
must go through a pre-market application process showing 
that the device is safe and effective, while a lower risk device 
can be marketed if shown to be substantially equivalent to an 
already marketed device.  Food and cosmetic products may be 
marketed without FDA evaluation or review, though for 
genetically engineered food products, the FDA and industry 
engage in voluntary consultation prior to market entry.  In 
2006, the FDA established a Nanotechnology Task Force to 
investigate “regulatory approaches that encourage the 
continued development of innovative, safe and effective FDA-
regulated products that use nanotechnology materials.”23  
Following a public hearing in October 2006, the Task Force 
released its findings in mid-2007.  This report concluded that 
the FDA need not develop a new regulatory framework or 
special regulations for nanotechnology at the current time. 
Furthermore, the report concluded that no new labeling was 
necessary to indicate that specific products included 
nanoparticles or were manufactured using nanotechnology.24  
Using its established oversight paths, the FDA has approved 
nano-drug products such as Abraxane® anticancer drug25 and 
Estasorb® topical estrogen therapy26 as well as nano-device 
products such as Vitoss® bone graft substitute27 and EnSeal™ 
 22. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2000). 
 23. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Forms Internal 
Nanotechnology Task Force, (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4241B1-02-33-FDA-
Nano%20FDA%20News %20release.pdf. 
 24. NANOTECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 34 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
nanotechnology/taskforce/report2007.pdf. 
 25. See Abraxis Biosciences, Inc. for information on Abraxane. Abraxane 
Home Page, http://abraxane.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 26. See Graceway Pharmaceuticals, LLC for information on Estrasorb. 
Estrasorb Home Page, http://www.estrasorb.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 27. See Orthovita, Inc. for information on Vitoss. Vitoss Home Page, 
http://orthovitaportal.com/Vitoss%20Technical%20Information/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
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tissue sealing and hemostatis system for laparoscopic and 
open surgery.28  Many cosmetic products have entered the 
market that contain nanoparticles, such as BINOVA 
Cosmetics by Barneys New York®, Collagen Fusion™ 
Botanical Skincare System by AmerElite Solutions®, and 
Lipoduction™ Body Perfecting Complex by Osmotics.®29 
Another U.S. agency with relevant oversight 
responsibilities is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) pursuant to the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act (OSHAct).30  Health standards for workplace 
exposure to toxic substances are established after public notice 
of proposed standards and eliciting public comments.  This 
approach to overseeing occupational exposure to 
nanomaterials might be attempted, although OSHA has not 
yet taken any steps in this direction.  Current concerns in the 
workplace include engineered nanoparticles such as fullerenes 
and carbon nanotubes.31 However, critics have challenged 
OSHA’s oversight methods, questioning the scientific basis of 
standards, the role of economic factors and cost-benefit 
analysis in standard setting, how the agency has assessed the 
feasibility of standards, and the extent to which OSHAct 
allows nuanced consideration of degrees of risk.  Given that 
OSHA bears the burden of carrying out detailed risk 
assessments for the thousands of toxic substances on the 
market and that proposed standards must also be 
technologically feasible,32 critics have charged that OSHA’s 
oversight approach is inadequate for nanomaterials. 
Another relevant regulatory federal agency, the 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), has yet to act on oversight 
issues of nanotechnology, although it funds nanotechnology 
 28. See SurgRX, Inc. for information on EnSeal. EnSeal Home Page, 
http://www.surgrx.com/product.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). 
 29. See The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, supra note 3. 
 30. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2000). 
 31. The University of Minnesota recently held the Second International 
Symposium on Nanotechnology and Occupational Health on October 3–6, 
2005 focusing on issues of implications of nanotechnology in the workplace.  
UNIV. OF MINN.,  2D INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON NANOTECHNOLOGY AND 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (2005), available at  
http://www.environcorp.com/img/ media/CPE1322_NanoTechPrgBkt_2.pdf. 
 32. Nicholas A. Ashford & Charles C. Caldart, Government Regulation, 
in OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND 
PREVENTING DISEASE AND INJURY 39, 43–45 (Barry S. Levy, David H. 
Wegman, Sherry L. Baron & Rosemary K. Sokas eds., 5th ed. 2006). 
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research on food and agriculture.33  Similarly, the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) actively 
funds research into metrics for characterizing worker 
exposures, new measurement technologies, and for validating 
technologies for controlling inhalation exposures.34 With 
respect to nanotechnology specifically, NIOSH has organized 
workshops on technical issues relating to measurement 
methods and exposure assessment and has been proactive in 
terms of research initiatives and education.35  However, it has 
not yet delved into issues of nanotechnology oversight.36  
Thus, it appears that among U.S. federal agencies, the FDA 
and EPA have begun to consider how to oversee 
nanotechnology activities and products, while OSHA, USDA, 
and NIOSH have not yet taken significant steps in considering 
oversight mech
B. SYSTEMS TO COORDINATE AGENCIES 
Because nanotechnology implicates a number of 
government agencies, coordination is a significant issue.  
Systems for coordination must be considered part of the 
oversight debate.  An example of one such system is the U.S. 
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 
created by the federal Office of Science and Technology Policy 
in 1986 to coordinate regulation of products of biotechnology 
according to their intended use.37  The Framework identifies 
the EPA, FDA, and USDA as lead agencies to regulate specific 
products, envisioning that a single product may be regulated 
by a number of federal agencies.38  The Framework sees the 
products of biotechnology as the focus of regulation, rather 
 33. JENNIFER KUZMA & PETER VERHAGE, WOODROW WILSON 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, PROJECT ON EMERGING 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES, NANOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
PRODUCTION: ANTICIPATED APPLICATIONS 16 (2006), available at http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/nanotechnology_in_agriculture_food
/. 
 34. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671(22) (2000). 
 35. See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
Nanotechnology at NIOSH, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2007). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986). 
 38. Id. 
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than the field of biotechnology.39 Existing statutes are thus 
deemed sufficient and the agencies are charged with 
developing regulatory guidance and policies as needed under 
those statutes.40 
This Framework has not been applied to nanotechnology 
as yet.41  Applying the Framework or a comparable approach 
to nanotechnology would create a coordinated framework 
among the key governmental agencies.  As part of such a 
nanotechnology framework, relevant agencies could develop 
new regulatory structures, more specific guidance documents, 
and policy as needed.42  However, there is debate over 
whether this model has worked well for the products of 
biotechnology and specifically genetically engineered 
organisms (GEOs).  There have been no reports of large-scale 
adverse effects of GEOs on human or animal health or the 
environment, but critics have challenged the success of the 
Coordinated Framework in achieving interagency 
coordination, the adequacy of existing statutes to handle 
GEOs, and the success of agencies in performing risk 
assessment and providing guidance
C.  STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES 
Many states are recognizing and encouraging the 
development and commercialization of nanotechnology 
through funding initiatives and other support.  These statutes 
span a variety of commitments to nanotechnology, yet do not 
provide oversight mechanisms.  These provisions include 
identifying nanotechnology as a priority for the particular 
state; establishing monetary support and plans to develop and 
maintain research facilities; encouraging the application of 
nanotechnologies in particular areas, such as pharmaceuticals 
and environmental applications; creation of state tax credits or 
tax exemptions for costs of a facility designing, developing, or 
producing nanotechnology; issuing grants and advancing 
educational initiatives; and fostering industry-university 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 23303. 
 41. Jennifer Kuzma, Nanotechnology Oversight: Just Do It, 36 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10913, 10920 (2006). 
 42. Id. at 10922–23. 
 43. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-
PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 28–37, 144–78 (2000). 
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collaborations.44 
The city of Berkeley, California has passed a 
nanotechnology-specific ordinance regarding mandatory 
reporting procedures.  The disclosure guidelines require “[a]ll 
facilities that manufacture or use manufactured nanoparticles 
shall submit a separate written disclosure of the current 
toxicology, to the extent known, and how the facility will 
safely handle, monitor, contain, dispose, track inventory, 
prevent release and mitigate such materials.”45  The city of 
Cambridge, Massachusetts is also considering adopting an 
ordinance similar to that passed in Berkeley.46  A seventeen-
member advisory board made up of health and safety experts 
from Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
has been appointed to make policy recommendations to the 
Department of Public Health.47 The cities of Boston and 
Somerville, Massachusetts are also reportedly considering 
 44. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. III, § 17; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-144-
204(a)(15), (b)(2)(J), 15-4-2102(f)(2), 15-4-2103(a) (2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
88500(e) (Deering 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-48.5-108(3)(a), (c)(I)(B), 39-
26-722(1) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-124hh(a)(5),  (b)(4)(A)-(C), (c)(3) 
(2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-28-10(4)(2)(E) (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 74-99b83, 74-99b04 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23I, §§ (1)(7), (2), 
(4)–(5) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 125.2088a(a)(ii) (2007); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:9X-12(II) (West 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 209(7) (Consol. 2007); 
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3154(10(a) (Consol. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-
437.44(4) (2007); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 74 § 5060.1(a) (West 2007); OKL. ST. ANN. 
tit. 75 § 5060.4(14), 5060.43 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 284.740, 
351.350(11)(4)(b), 351.509 (West 2007); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6250.902(c) 
(West 2007); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 695(a)(1)(K) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
2-75-90(A), (B) (2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 481.0296(a)(5), 489.213(b), 
489.213(e), 489.213(h) (Vernon 2006); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 490.003(b)(7) 
(Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-38g-303(1)(c) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 
2.2-255(9) (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.48(25r) (West 2006). 
 45. BERKELEY, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 15.12.040(I) (2007); see also 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25500 (2007) (“[I]t is not the intent of the 
Legislature to preempt . . . local ordinances containing the same or greater 
standards and protections” regarding the release or threatened release of 
hazardous materials.); TOXICS MGMT. DIV., CITY OF BERKELEY PLANNING & 
DEV. DEP’T, INTRODUCTION TO MANUFACTURED NANOSCALE MATERIAL 
HEALTH & SAFETY DISCLOSURE FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD OF JUNE 1, 2007 
- JUNE 2, 2008 (2007), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/toxics/ 
Manufactured%20Nanoparticle%20Reporting%20Final.pdf. 
 46. Hiawatha Bray, Cambridge Considers Nanotech Curbs, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2007, at C1. 
 47. Catherine Williams, Big Talks Over Small Tech, MASS HIGH TECH, 
June 15, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/masshightech/ 
stories/2007/06/18/story1.html. 
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similar ordinances.48  These initiatives, while not oversight of 
nanotechnology per se, are an initial attempt by cities to 
require some local level of reporting and accountability for use 
of nanoparticles. 
D.  NON-GOVENMENTAL STANDARDS 
Oversight can be performed not just by government, but 
also by private companies and industry groups coordinating to 
articulate standards and create safeguards.  The Foresight 
Nanotech Institute, a nonprofit institute, has published 
voluntary “Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology 
Development” recommended for industry adoption.49  The non-
profit Institute for Molecular Manufacturing has also proposed 
industry guidelines specific to molecular nanotechnology with 
the assistance of the Foresight Nanotech Institute.50  DuPont 
has partnered with the non-profit Environmental Defense to 
develop a corporate framework to assess nanotechnology 
risk.51 The framework was published in Summer 2007 and 
focuses on steps for risk assessment within organizations that 
manufacture nanomaterials.52  Several non-governmental 
consumer and environmental organizations have been critical 
of the framework as it is premised on voluntary oversight and 
industry self-regulation.53 
E.  INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Other countries are also beginning to take action on 
nanotechnology oversight.  The British government, for 
example, commissioned the Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering, two premiere independent science 
 48. Bray, supra note 46. 
 49. Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology 
Development, FORESIGHT NANOTECH INST., April 2006, http://www.foresight. 
org/guidelines/current.html (draft version 6). 
 50. Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology 
Development, INST. MOLECULAR MANUFACTURING, April, 2006, http://www. 
imm.org/guidelines/ (draft version 6). 
 51. Virginia Gewin, Nanotech’s Big Issue, 443 NATURE 137, 137 (2006). 
 52. ENVTL. DEFENSE-DUPONT NANO PARTNERSHIP, NANO: RISK 
FRAMEWORK, 7 (2007), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/ 
documents/6496_Nano%20Risk%20Framework.pdf. 
 53. Activist Groups Reject DuPont-ED Nanotechnology Risk Framework, 
NANOWERK, Apr. 12, 2007, 
http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1766.php. 
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academies, to study developments in the field and to identify 
the potential pros and cons of nanotechnologies for society.54  
In a joint 2004 report, the academies proposed a ban on some 
uses of nanotechnology, stating that “the use of free (that is, 
not fixed in a matrix) manufactured nanoparticles in 
environmental applications such as remediation [should] be 
prohibited until appropriate research has been undertaken 
and it can be demonstrated that the potential benefits 
outweigh the potential risks.”55 
In France, the Ethics Committee of the French National 
Centre for Scientific Research (COMETS) published an 
October 2006 opinion, listing eight ethics recommendations for 
nanotechnology, including the creation of ethics guidelines for 
researchers.56  COMETS has advocated adoption of these 
recommendations by the French Ministry of Health and the 
French National Assembly’s parliamentary office on scientific 
and technological policy.57 
At the European Union level, the European Economic and 
Social Committee of the European Parliament published an 
opinion in 2005 recommending that the European Commission 
introduce methods to identify nanotechnology risks and 
propose European guidelines by 2008.58 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OVERSIGHT DEBATE 
This review of early oversight efforts by U.S. 
governmental agencies and non-governmental actors as well 
as international oversight efforts demonstrates the need for 
more work. No one agreed-upon approach or ideal model has 
 54. THE ROYAL SOC’Y & THE ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, NANOSCIENCE AND 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES (2004), available 
at http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm. 
 55. Id. at 85 (follow link titled “Chapter 10-Recommendations”). 
 56. Press Release, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, The 
CNRS Ethics Committee Publishes Its Recommendations on Nanotechnology 
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www2.cnrs.fr/en/727.htm. 
 57. Id. 
 58. EUROPEAN ECON. & SOC. COMM., OPINION ON THE COMMUNICATION 
FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE—NANOSCIENCES AND 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: AN ACTION PLAN FOR EUROPE 2005–2009 ¶ 3.5.7 
(2006), available at http://eescopinions.eesc.europa.eu/viewdoc.aspx?doc=%5C 
%5Cesppub1%5Cesp_public%5Cces%5Cint%5Cint277%5Cen%5Cces582-
2006_ ac_en.doc. 
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yet emerged. A variety of reports have recently issued from 
academics, professional organizations, scholarly organizations, 
and government bodies assessing existing regulatory 
frameworks, measuring public perceptions and understanding, 
and suggesting oversight options.59 
This debate on nanotechnology oversight is important. 
Progress in the field depends on societal interest, available 
funding, and ultimately public confidence. Without 
appropriate and effective oversight to minimize harms, 
maximize benefits, and assure standards, public confidence 
and funding may be at risk. Mishaps can retard development 
of even the most promising of technologies. One recent study 
shows that while consumers are excited about nanotechnology 
and its potential benefits, there is already concern about who 
is developing and promoting this technology, who will assess 
and manage the potential risks, and who will be responsible 
for monitoring products after they hit the marketplace.60 
The impact of past negative experiences with other new 
 59. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW THE NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY 
INITIATIVE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A MATTER OF SIZE: TRIENNIAL 
REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE (2006), available at 
http://www.nap. edu/catalog.php?record_id=11752; NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G, 
& TECH. SUBCOMM., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, 
AND SAFETY RESEARCH NEEDS FOR ENGINEERED NANOSCALE MATERIALS 
(2006), available at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_EHS_research_needs.pdf; 
NANOTECHNOLOGY WORKGROUP, U.S. EPA, NANOTECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER 
(2007), available at http://es.epa.gov/ncer/nano/publications/whitepaper 
12022005.pdf; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
EMS/INNOVATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND 
RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, RCRA REGULATION OF WASTES FROM THE PRODUCTION, 
USE, AND DISPOSAL OF NANOMATERIALS (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/environ/ nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND 
RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, REGULATION OF NANOSCALE MATERIALS UNDER THE 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
environ/nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
THE ADEQUACY OF FIFRA TO REGULATE NANOTECHNOLOGY-BASED 
PESTICIDES (2006), available at http://www.abanet. org/environ/nanotech/; 
DAVIES, supra note 5; PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., REPORT 
FINDINGS: BASED ON A NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADULTS (2006), available at 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/98; ANDREW D. MAYNARD, 
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, PROJECT ON EMERGING 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES, NANOTECHNOLOGY: A RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR 
ADDRESSING RISK (2006), available at 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/nanotechnology_researc
h_strategy_for/; CTR. FOR SCI., TECH., & PUB. POLICY, supra note 8. 
 60. MACOUBRIE, supra note 6. 
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technologies shows the need to consider appropriate oversight 
models for nanotechnology and then to develop whatever new 
or modified oversight mechanisms, if any, are required. For 
instance, the field of gene transfer research in human beings 
(often called “gene therapy”) was jolted by the 1999 death of 
18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger, a gene transfer research subject, 
and subsequent revelations of other adverse events that had 
not been successfully communicated between the key 
oversight bodies: the FDA and the Recombinant DNA 
Advisory Committee (RAC).61  
Examples outside the domain of biomedicine include the 
1999-2000 failure to segregate a genetically modified food 
source approved only for animal feed. StarLink was a 
genetically modified yellow corn variety containing an 
insecticidal protein.62 The EPA approved it for use only in 
animal feed due to concern that the genetically modified 
protein, Cry9C, did not break down easily in the human 
digestive system and might provoke human allergies.63 
However, StarLink became commingled with corn-based 
products in the human food supply in an evident failure of 
enforcement by post-market oversight systems.64 The 
backlash and negative effect on public confidence wer
iderable.65 
If nanotechnology is to avoid similar negative events and 
ensuing setbacks, it is important to consider how to 
proactive
PING OVERSIGHT OPT
NANOTECHNOLOGY 
There are a number of oversight options for 
nanotechnology, including creating new laws and regulations 
for applications of nanotechnology, revising existing laws and 
 61. Doris Teicher Zallen, US Gene Therapy in Crisis, 16 TRENDS 
GENETICS 272, 274 (2000). 
 62. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR & JODY S. TICK, THE STARLINK CASE: ISSUES 
FOR THE FUTURE 3 (2001), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_ 
ektid33384.aspx?category=442. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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standards), and revising existing 
non
stifle innovation or impose 
unn
strategies are needed.69 Disappointed with current movement 
regulations, interpreting existing laws and regulations to 
cover nanoproducts, designing new non-regulatory governance 
approaches (e.g., voluntary 
-regulatory approaches. 
Oversight frameworks and regulatory approaches are 
diverse, and this oversight is conducted by a range of 
institutions with various capabilities, cultures, and motives.66 
Regulations can articulate general guidelines or specific 
standards. They can regulate the result or mandate the 
processes by which the results are achieved. They can operate 
by motivating industry to share information, innovate, or 
change to meet articulated targets, or they can manage 
industry more directly through what is often called “command 
and control.”67 Regulatory and oversight tools include 
performance standards, tradable allowances, consultation 
between government and industry, and pre-market safety and 
efficacy reviews. The choice of approach can profoundly affect 
technological development, individual interests, and collective 
interests.68 It is important to achieve an appropriate balance 
so that oversight does not 
ecessary costs or burdens. 
Nanotechnology may pose significant oversight 
challenges. The diversity of nanoproducts may preclude a 
single approach or framework and instead require different 
oversight regimes for different product types. In addition, risk 
assessment for nanomaterials may be difficult. There is little 
information to date on the effects of nanotechnology, including 
what types of human exposure to anticipate, dose-response 
relationships, kinetics and cellular interactions, fate and 
transport in the environment, and correlations of properties of 
materials to their toxicity. A number of commentators believe 
that any risk assessment should consider the special 
properties and effects of nanoparticles and that new toxicology 
                                                          
 66. See John Abraham, Regulatory Science as Culture: Contested Two-
Dimensional Values at the US FDA, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 309–14, 329–31 
nology, and the 
 the development and effects of various 
 Studies of Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH 
(2002). 
 67. Jonathan B. Wiener, The Regulation of Tech
Technology of Regulation, 26 TECH. SOC’Y 483, 489 (2004). 
 68. See generally id. (tracing
types of regulatory instruments). 
 69. See, e.g., Günter Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging 
Discipline Evolving from
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towards voluntary and industry-driven schemes, a coalition of 
civil society, public interest, environmental, and labor 
organizations have signed a statement articulating general 
principles for nanotechnology oversight.70 These include the 
creation of a precautionary foundation, developing mandatory 
nano-specific regulations along with provisions for 
manufacturer liability, assuring the health and safety of the 
public and workers, protecting the environment, and 
facilitating transparency and public participation in the 
process.71 
Because nanotechnology raises significant oversight 
challenges, it is important to consider now what kind of 
oversight structures and processes would work well. This calls 
for evaluating both emerging approaches to nanotechnology 
oversight as well as oversight strategies used in the past for 
closely related technologies. We can learn from case studies of 
oversight for past technologies and products which approaches 
have worked well and which have not.72 
There are some methods already in use for evaluating 
oversight approaches, though they may require refinement. 
These methods are grounded in different disciplines and 
literatures, including public policy analysis, economic impact 
assessment, and ethical evaluation. Whatever the disciplinary 
origin, evaluation of oversight models to date has typically 
used just a few criteria for analysis. For example, regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA) by the U.S. federal government has 
focused on the benefits and economic costs of proposed rules.73 
Executive Order 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review 
suggests broader criteria, requiring for every new regulation 
                                                          
PERSP. 823, 835 (2005). 
 70. See ACCIÓN ECOLÓGICA ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND NANOMATERIALS 1 (2008), available at http://www. 
icta.org/pubs/publications.cfm?page_id=15&section_title=Nanotechnology. 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. This is the focus of our current National Science Foundation grant, 
SES-0608791 (Principal Investigator Susan M. Wolf; Co-Principal 
Investigators Efrosini Kokkoli, Jennifer Kuzma, Jordan Paradise and 
Gurumurthy Ramachandran). Co-author Ralph Hall serves as a Working 
Group member on this project. An abstract is available at http://nsf.gov/ 
awardsearch/showAward.do?AwardNumber=0608791. 
 73. See U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS, at M2 (1983), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/ 
vwRepNumLookup/EE-0228A?OpenDocument. 
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not only a cost-benefit test, but also evaluation of adverse 
effects of regulations on health and the environment, 
qualitative assessment of 
rances of transparency.74 
Some groups of scholars are making progress in 
systematically integrating multiple criteria for analyzing 
oversight frameworks. For example, one team designed the 
Fast Environmental Regulatory Tool (FERET) as a 
computerized template to “structure the basic integration of 
impacts and valuation; provide a core survey of the literature; 
incorporate uncertainty through simulation methods; and 
deliver a bottom line benefit-cost analysis that reports 
quantitative impacts, economics values, and qualitative 
elements.”75 A more qualitative oversight evaluation method 
grounded in bioethics is reported in a 2004 article from the 
Consortium to Examine Clinical Research Ethics.76 This 
diverse expert group designed fifteen oversight problems in 
research involving human participants and evaluate
osed reforms would address those challenges.77 
Oversight evaluation methods thus range from 
quantitative models to qualitative expert group consensus 
approaches. Whichever method we use to develop 
nanotechnology oversight options, a preliminary inquiry 
should focus on the goals oversight should serve. Likely goals 
in developing oversight mechanisms for nanotechnology are 
transparency in development, opportunities for public input, 
accountability to diverse stakeholders, ability to safeguard 
human and environmental health, and ability to foster 
innovation. The mechanisms should also be able to cope with
l materials that will undoubtedly be developed over time. 
Debate over the need for and ultimate scope of 
nanotechnology oversight is becoming increasingly urgent. 
Development of sound oversight mechanisms responsive to 
public concerns and values as well as nanoscience innovation 
 74. Wiener, supra note 67, at 493. 
 75. R. Scott Farrow et al., Facilitating Regulatory Design and 
Stakeholder Participation: The FERET Template with an Application to the 
Clean Air Act, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH 
AND SAFETY 429, 430 (Paul Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow eds., 2001). 
 76. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants 
Research: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 282, 282 (2004). 
 77. Id. 
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hes have worked well for related 
technologies in the past. 
 
will be critical to the evolution of this field. Creating oversight 
systems can and should be deliberate, schooled by analyses of 
different oversight regimes and historical consideration of 
which oversight approac
